Open knowledge and changing the subject
Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or n...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2017
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107671 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323 |
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author | Yablo, Stephen |
author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Yablo, Stephen |
author_sort | Yablo, Stephen |
collection | MIT |
description | Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness” (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:59:44Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/107671 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:59:44Z |
publishDate | 2017 |
publisher | Springer Netherlands |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/1076712022-10-01T00:29:19Z Open knowledge and changing the subject Yablo, Stephen Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Yablo, Stephen Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness” (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q. 2017-03-23T18:53:01Z 2017-06-19T21:40:53Z 2016-08 2017-03-03T04:48:33Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0031-8116 1573-0883 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107671 Yablo, Stephen. “Open Knowledge and Changing the Subject.” Philosophical Studies 174, no. 4 (August 18, 2016): 1047–1071. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323 en http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0724-1 Philosophical Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht application/pdf Springer Netherlands Springer Netherlands |
spellingShingle | Yablo, Stephen Open knowledge and changing the subject |
title | Open knowledge and changing the subject |
title_full | Open knowledge and changing the subject |
title_fullStr | Open knowledge and changing the subject |
title_full_unstemmed | Open knowledge and changing the subject |
title_short | Open knowledge and changing the subject |
title_sort | open knowledge and changing the subject |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107671 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT yablostephen openknowledgeandchangingthesubject |