Open knowledge and changing the subject

Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or n...

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Main Author: Yablo, Stephen
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Netherlands 2017
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107671
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323
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author Yablo, Stephen
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Yablo, Stephen
author_sort Yablo, Stephen
collection MIT
description Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness” (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1076712022-10-01T00:29:19Z Open knowledge and changing the subject Yablo, Stephen Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Yablo, Stephen Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness” (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q. 2017-03-23T18:53:01Z 2017-06-19T21:40:53Z 2016-08 2017-03-03T04:48:33Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0031-8116 1573-0883 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107671 Yablo, Stephen. “Open Knowledge and Changing the Subject.” Philosophical Studies 174, no. 4 (August 18, 2016): 1047–1071. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323 en http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0724-1 Philosophical Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht application/pdf Springer Netherlands Springer Netherlands
spellingShingle Yablo, Stephen
Open knowledge and changing the subject
title Open knowledge and changing the subject
title_full Open knowledge and changing the subject
title_fullStr Open knowledge and changing the subject
title_full_unstemmed Open knowledge and changing the subject
title_short Open knowledge and changing the subject
title_sort open knowledge and changing the subject
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107671
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323
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