Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment
We consider a problem where an uninformed principal makes a timing decision interacting with an informed but biased agent. Because time is irreversible, the direction of the bias crucially affects the agent's ability to credibly communicate information. When the agent favors late decision makin...
Main Authors: | Grenadier, Steven R., Malenko, Andrey, Malenko, Nadya |
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Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
American Economic Association
2017
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109130 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6429-850X |
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