Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses

We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. Th...

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Main Authors: Fishman, Michael J., Parker, Jonathan A.
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Oxford University Press 2017
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109137
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5441-6296
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author Fishman, Michael J.
Parker, Jonathan A.
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Fishman, Michael J.
Parker, Jonathan A.
author_sort Fishman, Michael J.
collection MIT
description We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. This strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments. Switches to valuation equilibria, valuation runs, look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially, only if subsidized.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1091372024-07-11T19:50:49Z Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses Fishman, Michael J. Parker, Jonathan A. Sloan School of Management Parker, Jonathan A. We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. This strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments. Switches to valuation equilibria, valuation runs, look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially, only if subsidized. 2017-05-17T14:13:42Z 2017-05-17T14:13:42Z 2015-04 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0893-9454 1465-7368 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109137 Fishman, Michael J. and Parker, Jonathan A. “Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses.” Review of Financial Studies 28, no. 9 (April 2015): 2575–2607. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5441-6296 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv025 Review of Financial Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press NBER
spellingShingle Fishman, Michael J.
Parker, Jonathan A.
Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
title Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
title_full Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
title_fullStr Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
title_full_unstemmed Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
title_short Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
title_sort valuation adverse selection and market collapses
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109137
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5441-6296
work_keys_str_mv AT fishmanmichaelj valuationadverseselectionandmarketcollapses
AT parkerjonathana valuationadverseselectionandmarketcollapses