Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. Th...
Main Authors: | Fishman, Michael J., Parker, Jonathan A. |
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Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Oxford University Press
2017
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109137 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5441-6296 |
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