A dynamic model of barter exchange

We consider the problem of efficient operation of a barter exchange platform for indivisible goods. We introduce a dynamic model of barter exchange where in each period one agent arrives with a single item she wants to exchange for a different item. We study a homogeneous and stochastic environment:...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kanoria, Yash, Anderson, Ross Michael, Ashlagi, Itai, Gamarnik, David
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) 2017
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109184
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8898-8778
_version_ 1826208515371302912
author Kanoria, Yash
Anderson, Ross Michael
Ashlagi, Itai
Gamarnik, David
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
Kanoria, Yash
Anderson, Ross Michael
Ashlagi, Itai
Gamarnik, David
author_sort Kanoria, Yash
collection MIT
description We consider the problem of efficient operation of a barter exchange platform for indivisible goods. We introduce a dynamic model of barter exchange where in each period one agent arrives with a single item she wants to exchange for a different item. We study a homogeneous and stochastic environment: an agent is interested in the item possessed by another agent with probability p, independently for all pairs of agents. We consider two settings with respect to the types of allowed exchanges: a) Only two-way cycles, in which two agents swap their items, b) Two or three-way cycles. The goal of the platform is to minimize the average waiting time of an agent. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that in each of these settings, a policy that conducts exchanges in a greedy fashion is near optimal, among a large class of policies that includes batching policies. Further, we find that for small p, allowing three-cycles can greatly improve the waiting time over the two-cycles only setting. Specifically, we find that a greedy policy achieves an average waiting time of Θ(1/p2) in setting a), and Θ(1/p3/2) in setting b). Thus, a platform can achieve the smallest waiting times by using a greedy policy, and by facilitating three cycles, if possible. Our findings are consistent with empirical and computational observations which compare batching policies in the context of kidney exchange programs.
first_indexed 2024-09-23T14:06:34Z
format Article
id mit-1721.1/109184
institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
language en_US
last_indexed 2024-09-23T14:06:34Z
publishDate 2017
publisher Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)
record_format dspace
spelling mit-1721.1/1091842022-10-01T19:16:55Z A dynamic model of barter exchange Kanoria, Yash Anderson, Ross Michael Ashlagi, Itai Gamarnik, David Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center Sloan School of Management Anderson, Ross Michael Ashlagi, Itai Gamarnik, David We consider the problem of efficient operation of a barter exchange platform for indivisible goods. We introduce a dynamic model of barter exchange where in each period one agent arrives with a single item she wants to exchange for a different item. We study a homogeneous and stochastic environment: an agent is interested in the item possessed by another agent with probability p, independently for all pairs of agents. We consider two settings with respect to the types of allowed exchanges: a) Only two-way cycles, in which two agents swap their items, b) Two or three-way cycles. The goal of the platform is to minimize the average waiting time of an agent. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that in each of these settings, a policy that conducts exchanges in a greedy fashion is near optimal, among a large class of policies that includes batching policies. Further, we find that for small p, allowing three-cycles can greatly improve the waiting time over the two-cycles only setting. Specifically, we find that a greedy policy achieves an average waiting time of Θ(1/p2) in setting a), and Θ(1/p3/2) in setting b). Thus, a platform can achieve the smallest waiting times by using a greedy policy, and by facilitating three cycles, if possible. Our findings are consistent with empirical and computational observations which compare batching policies in the context of kidney exchange programs. 2017-05-18T20:36:05Z 2017-05-18T20:36:05Z 2015 2015-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 978-1-61197-374-7 978-1-61197-373-0 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109184 Anderson, Ross; Ashlagi, Itai; Gamarnik, David and Kanoria, Yash. “A Dynamic Model of Barter Exchange.” Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (2015): 1925–1933. © 2015 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8898-8778 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.129 Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) SIAM
spellingShingle Kanoria, Yash
Anderson, Ross Michael
Ashlagi, Itai
Gamarnik, David
A dynamic model of barter exchange
title A dynamic model of barter exchange
title_full A dynamic model of barter exchange
title_fullStr A dynamic model of barter exchange
title_full_unstemmed A dynamic model of barter exchange
title_short A dynamic model of barter exchange
title_sort dynamic model of barter exchange
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109184
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8898-8778
work_keys_str_mv AT kanoriayash adynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT andersonrossmichael adynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT ashlagiitai adynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT gamarnikdavid adynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT kanoriayash dynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT andersonrossmichael dynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT ashlagiitai dynamicmodelofbarterexchange
AT gamarnikdavid dynamicmodelofbarterexchange