Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises
This paper focuses on the security assessment of electricity distribution networks (DNs) with vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is a simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation setpoints. The loss to the defender (DN operator) in...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
2017
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110203 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6549-131X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1554-015X |
| _version_ | 1826191666008031232 |
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| author | Shelar, Devendra Anil Amin, Saurabh |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Shelar, Devendra Anil Amin, Saurabh |
| author_sort | Shelar, Devendra Anil |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This paper focuses on the security assessment of electricity distribution networks (DNs) with vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is a simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation setpoints. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A three-stage defender-attacker-defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation setpoints; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and non-compromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based on an ε-linear power-flow model. The set of critical DER nodes and the setpoint manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to computing attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in preattack and postattack conditions, respectively. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:59:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/110203 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:59:29Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1102032022-09-26T09:42:31Z Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises Shelar, Devendra Anil Amin, Saurabh Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Shelar, Devendra Anil Amin, Saurabh This paper focuses on the security assessment of electricity distribution networks (DNs) with vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is a simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation setpoints. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A three-stage defender-attacker-defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation setpoints; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and non-compromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based on an ε-linear power-flow model. The set of critical DER nodes and the setpoint manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to computing attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in preattack and postattack conditions, respectively. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CNS-1238959) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CNS-1238962) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CNS- 1239054) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CNS-1239166) Sandia National Laboratories United States. Air Force. Research Laboratory (Award FA8750-14-2-0180) 2017-06-23T14:03:03Z 2017-06-23T14:03:03Z 2016-08 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 2325-5870 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110203 Shelar, Devendra, and Saurabh Amin. “Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises.” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems 4.1 (2017): 23–36. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6549-131X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1554-015X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tcns.2016.2598427 IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) arXiv |
| spellingShingle | Shelar, Devendra Anil Amin, Saurabh Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises |
| title | Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises |
| title_full | Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises |
| title_fullStr | Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises |
| title_full_unstemmed | Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises |
| title_short | Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises |
| title_sort | security assessment of electricity distribution networks under der node compromises |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110203 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6549-131X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1554-015X |
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