A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Elsevier
2017
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110438 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
| _version_ | 1811088584903491584 |
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| author | Ashlagi, Itai Karagözoğlu, Emin Klaus, Bettina |
| author2 | Sloan School of Management |
| author_facet | Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai Karagözoğlu, Emin Klaus, Bettina |
| author_sort | Ashlagi, Itai |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
Highlights
► We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems, in which a positive-valued estate has to be divided among a set of agents. ► We show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. ► All our results point towards the same intuitive message: if it is impossible or difficult to test the legitimacy of claims, the conflict will escalate to the highest possible level and equal division is the “non-discriminating” outcome in Nash equilibrium. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:04:22Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/110438 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:04:22Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1104382022-10-01T19:00:07Z A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems Ashlagi, Itai Karagözoğlu, Emin Klaus, Bettina Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored. Highlights ► We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems, in which a positive-valued estate has to be divided among a set of agents. ► We show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. ► All our results point towards the same intuitive message: if it is impossible or difficult to test the legitimacy of claims, the conflict will escalate to the highest possible level and equal division is the “non-discriminating” outcome in Nash equilibrium. 2017-07-05T13:33:16Z 2017-07-05T13:33:16Z 2012-02 2011-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0165-4896 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110438 Ashlagi, Itai; Karagözoğlu, Emin and Klaus, Bettina. "A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems." Mathematical Social Sciences 63, 3 (May 2012): 228-233 © 2012 Elsevier https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.004 Mathematical Social Sciences Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Ashlagi, Itai Karagözoğlu, Emin Klaus, Bettina A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| title | A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| title_full | A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| title_fullStr | A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| title_full_unstemmed | A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| title_short | A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| title_sort | non cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110438 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
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