Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies
We compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter that captures qualitative properties of the inverse deman...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Elsevier
2017
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110536 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2658-8239 |
| _version_ | 1826196263985479680 |
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| author | Tsitsiklis, John N Xu, Yunjian |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems Tsitsiklis, John N Xu, Yunjian |
| author_sort | Tsitsiklis, John N |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter that captures qualitative properties of the inverse demand function and the number of suppliers (or the maximum of the suppliers’ market shares). The lower bounds are tight when the inverse demand function is affine. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:24:09Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/110536 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:24:09Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1105362022-09-26T17:37:34Z Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies Tsitsiklis, John N Xu, Yunjian Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems Tsitsiklis, John N Xu, Yunjian We compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter that captures qualitative properties of the inverse demand function and the number of suppliers (or the maximum of the suppliers’ market shares). The lower bounds are tight when the inverse demand function is affine. 2017-07-07T15:45:45Z 2017-07-07T15:45:45Z 2013-05 2013-04 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0167-6377 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110536 Tsitsiklis, John N. and Xu, Yunjian. “Profit Loss in Cournot Oligopolies.” Operations Research Letters 41, 4 (July 2013): 415–420 © 2013 Elsevier B.V. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2658-8239 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.012 Operations Research Letters Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Tsitsiklis, John N Xu, Yunjian Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies |
| title | Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies |
| title_full | Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies |
| title_fullStr | Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies |
| title_short | Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies |
| title_sort | profit loss in cournot oligopolies |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110536 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2658-8239 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tsitsiklisjohnn profitlossincournotoligopolies AT xuyunjian profitlossincournotoligopolies |