Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees
How should one sell an item to a buyer whose value for the item will only be realized next week? E.g. consider selling a flight to some executive who may or may not have a meeting with a client next week. Suppose that both the seller and the buyer only know a distribution, F, from which the buyer...
Main Authors: | Ashlagi, Itai, Daskalakis, Konstantinos, Haghpanah Jahromi, Nima |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2017
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110836 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8066-7777 |
Similar Items
Similar Items
-
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
by: Ashlagi, Itai, et al.
Published: (2014) -
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
by: Ashlagi, Itai, et al.
Published: (2014) -
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
by: Ashlagi, Itai, et al.
Published: (2014) -
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
by: Daskalakis, Konstantinos, et al.
Published: (2020) -
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
by: Ashlagi, Itai, et al.
Published: (2011)