Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?

We study the problem of optimal auction design in a valuation model, explicitly motivated by online ad auctions, in which there is two-way informational asymmetry, in the sense that private information is available to both the seller (the item type) and the bidders (their type), and the value of eac...

पूर्ण विवरण

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखकों: Daskalakis, Konstantinos, Papadimitriou, Christos H, Tzamos, Christos
अन्य लेखक: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
स्वरूप: लेख
भाषा:en_US
प्रकाशित: Association for Computing Machinery 2017
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110837
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069

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