Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
We study the problem of optimal auction design in a valuation model, explicitly motivated by online ad auctions, in which there is two-way informational asymmetry, in the sense that private information is available to both the seller (the item type) and the bidders (their type), and the value of eac...
मुख्य लेखकों: | Daskalakis, Konstantinos, Papadimitriou, Christos H, Tzamos, Christos |
---|---|
अन्य लेखक: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
स्वरूप: | लेख |
भाषा: | en_US |
प्रकाशित: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2017
|
ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110837 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069 |
समान संसाधन
-
Mechanism design : from optimal transport theory to revenue maximization
द्वारा: Tzamos, Christos
प्रकाशित: (2017) -
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
द्वारा: Deckelbaum, Alan T, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2017) -
The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
द्वारा: Deckelbaum, Alan, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2015) -
Optimal Pricing Is Hard
द्वारा: Deckelbaum, Alan, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2015) -
Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
द्वारा: Daskalakis, Konstantinos, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2015)