Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2017.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2017
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112021 |
| _version_ | 1811083078389465088 |
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| author | Kim, Jinhwan |
| author2 | Rodrigo S. Verdi and Eric C. So. |
| author_facet | Rodrigo S. Verdi and Eric C. So. Kim, Jinhwan |
| author_sort | Kim, Jinhwan |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2017. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:20:29Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/112021 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:20:29Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1120212019-04-10T14:31:39Z Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities Feedback effect of disclosure externalities Kim, Jinhwan Rodrigo S. Verdi and Eric C. So. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management. Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2017. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 32-34). Information about one firm has the potential to affect the stock price of another firm. I investigate whether managers recognize this potential and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms. by Jinhwan Kim. S.M. in Management Research 2017-10-30T15:28:02Z 2017-10-30T15:28:02Z 2017 2017 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112021 1006378585 eng MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 45 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Sloan School of Management. Kim, Jinhwan Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| title | Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| title_full | Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| title_fullStr | Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| title_full_unstemmed | Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| title_short | Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| title_sort | weaponized disclosure the feedback effect of disclosure externalities |
| topic | Sloan School of Management. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112021 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kimjinhwan weaponizeddisclosurethefeedbackeffectofdisclosureexternalities AT kimjinhwan feedbackeffectofdisclosureexternalities |