Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision

By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g....

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Main Authors: Magid, Rachel, Yan, Phyllis L., Siegel, Max Harmon, Tenenbaum, Joshua B, Schulz, Laura E
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Format: Article
Published: Wiley Blackwell 2017
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112321
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1767-3247
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4510-3145
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1925-2035
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2981-8039
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author Magid, Rachel
Yan, Phyllis L.
Siegel, Max Harmon
Tenenbaum, Joshua B
Schulz, Laura E
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Magid, Rachel
Yan, Phyllis L.
Siegel, Max Harmon
Tenenbaum, Joshua B
Schulz, Laura E
author_sort Magid, Rachel
collection MIT
description By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties' belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1123212022-10-01T22:16:51Z Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision Magid, Rachel Yan, Phyllis L. Siegel, Max Harmon Tenenbaum, Joshua B Schulz, Laura E Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Magid, Rachel Yan, Phyllis L. Siegel, Max Harmon Tenenbaum, Joshua B Schulz, Laura E By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties' belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence. National Science Foundation (U.S.). Division of Computing and Communication Foundations (1231216) National Science Foundation (U.S.). Division of Research on Learning in Formal and Informal Settings (0744213) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (STC Center for Brains, Minds and Machines Award CCF-1231216) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (0744213) 2017-11-28T21:27:53Z 2017-11-28T21:27:53Z 2017-05 2015-12 2017-11-20T20:08:41Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1363-755X 1467-7687 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112321 Magid, Rachel W., et al. “Changing Minds: Children’s Inferences about Third Party Belief Revision.” Developmental Science, May 2017, p. e12553. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1767-3247 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4510-3145 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1925-2035 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2981-8039 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12553 Developmental Science Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Wiley Blackwell Wiley
spellingShingle Magid, Rachel
Yan, Phyllis L.
Siegel, Max Harmon
Tenenbaum, Joshua B
Schulz, Laura E
Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision
title Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision
title_full Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision
title_fullStr Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision
title_full_unstemmed Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision
title_short Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision
title_sort changing minds children s inferences about third party belief revision
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112321
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1767-3247
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4510-3145
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1925-2035
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2981-8039
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