A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind
In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the e...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Sage Publications
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113090 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791 |
| _version_ | 1811074673861984256 |
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| author | Phillips, Jonathan Ong, Desmond C. Surtees, Andrew D. R. Frank, Michael C. Xin, Yijing Williams, Samantha L. Saxe, Rebecca R |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Phillips, Jonathan Ong, Desmond C. Surtees, Andrew D. R. Frank, Michael C. Xin, Yijing Williams, Samantha L. Saxe, Rebecca R |
| author_sort | Phillips, Jonathan |
| collection | MIT |
| description | In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults. Keywords theory of mind, automaticity, false belief, replication, open data, open materials |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:53:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/113090 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:53:33Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Sage Publications |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1130902022-09-30T17:32:02Z A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind Phillips, Jonathan Ong, Desmond C. Surtees, Andrew D. R. Frank, Michael C. Xin, Yijing Williams, Samantha L. Saxe, Rebecca R Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Saxe, Rebecca Xin, Yijing Williams, Samantha L. Saxe, Rebecca R In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults. Keywords theory of mind, automaticity, false belief, replication, open data, open materials United States. Office of Naval Research (Grant N00014-13-1-0287) 2018-01-12T16:57:11Z 2018-01-12T16:57:11Z 2015-08 2014-03 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0956-7976 1467-9280 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113090 Phillips, Jonathan et al. “A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind.” Psychological Science 26, 9 (August 2015): 1353–1367 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791 en_US https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614558717 Psychological Science Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Sage Publications Prof. Saxe via Courtney Crummett |
| spellingShingle | Phillips, Jonathan Ong, Desmond C. Surtees, Andrew D. R. Frank, Michael C. Xin, Yijing Williams, Samantha L. Saxe, Rebecca R A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind |
| title | A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind |
| title_full | A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind |
| title_fullStr | A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind |
| title_short | A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind |
| title_sort | second look at automatic theory of mind |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113090 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791 |
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