Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation
A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed. The resulting random assignment ope...
Main Authors: | Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Angrist, Joshua, Narita, Yusuke, Pathak, Parag |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
The Econometric Society
2018
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113677 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6992-8956 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0772-9457 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
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