Equilibrium analysis for a leader-follower game with noisy observations: A pace forward in Witsenhausen's counterexample conjecture

In this paper, we view Witsenhausen's problem as a leader-follower coordination game in which the action of the leader is corrupted by an additive normal noise, before reaching the follower. The leader who observes the realization of the state, chooses an action that minimizes her distance to t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ajorlou, Amir, Jadbabaie-Moghadam, Ali
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 2018
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113879
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3553-4638