Model-based security analysis of a water treatment system
An approach to analyzing the security of a cyber-physical system (CPS) is proposed, where the behavior of a physical plant and its controller are captured in approximate models, and their interaction is rigorously checked to discover potential attacks that involve a varying number of compromised sen...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2018
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114444 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0194-3989 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4864-078X |
| Summary: | An approach to analyzing the security of a cyber-physical system (CPS) is proposed, where the behavior of a physical plant and its controller are captured in approximate models, and their interaction is rigorously checked to discover potential attacks that involve a varying number of compromised sensors and actuators. As a preliminary study, this approach has been applied to a fully functional water treatment testbed constructed at the Singapore University of Technology and Design. The analysis revealed previously unknown attacks that were confirmed to pose serious threats to the safety of the testbed, and suggests a number of research challenges and opportunities for applying a similar type of formal analysis to cyber-physical security. |
|---|