Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads
How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the str...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
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National Academy of Sciences (U.S.)
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114901 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5178-1108 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9034-6635 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6809-9380 |
| Summary: | How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times. Keywords: isotopic tomography; nuclear weapons; disarmament; verification |
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