Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads
How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the str...
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| Format: | Article |
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National Academy of Sciences (U.S.)
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114901 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5178-1108 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9034-6635 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6809-9380 |
| _version_ | 1826214203286880256 |
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| author | Kemp, R. Scott Danagoulian, Areg Macdonald, Ruaridh R. Vavrek, Jayson Robert |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering Kemp, R. Scott Danagoulian, Areg Macdonald, Ruaridh R. Vavrek, Jayson Robert |
| author_sort | Kemp, R. Scott |
| collection | MIT |
| description | How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times. Keywords: isotopic tomography; nuclear weapons; disarmament; verification |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:01:44Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/114901 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:01:44Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | National Academy of Sciences (U.S.) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1149012022-10-02T05:48:40Z Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads Kemp, R. Scott Danagoulian, Areg Macdonald, Ruaridh R. Vavrek, Jayson Robert Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering Kemp, R. Scott Danagoulian, Areg Macdonald, Ruaridh R. Vavrek, Jayson Robert How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times. Keywords: isotopic tomography; nuclear weapons; disarmament; verification United States. Department of Energy (Award DE-NA0002534) 2018-04-23T20:12:52Z 2018-04-23T20:12:52Z 2016-08 2016-03 2018-04-20T14:49:49Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 0027-8424 1091-6490 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114901 Kemp, R. Scott et al. “Physical Cryptographic Verification of Nuclear Warheads.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, 31 (July 2016): 8618–8623 © 2016 National Academy of Sciences https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5178-1108 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9034-6635 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6809-9380 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1603916113 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf National Academy of Sciences (U.S.) National Academy of Sciences |
| spellingShingle | Kemp, R. Scott Danagoulian, Areg Macdonald, Ruaridh R. Vavrek, Jayson Robert Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| title | Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| title_full | Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| title_fullStr | Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| title_full_unstemmed | Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| title_short | Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| title_sort | physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114901 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5178-1108 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9034-6635 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6809-9380 |
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