Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India*
In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market struct...
Main Authors: | Duflo, Esther, Greenstone, Michael, Pande, Rohini, Ryan, Nicholas |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
Oxford University Press
2018
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115307 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6105-617X |
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