Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation
I defend the theory that the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. Many “counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“first-level reasons”) from the reasons why those reasons are reasons (“second-level re...
Main Author: | Skow, Bradford |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
University of Chicago Press
2018
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115362 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540 |
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