Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/

Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lu, Fangzhou. Ph. D. Sloan School of Management
Other Authors: Jonathan Parker.
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115650
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author Lu, Fangzhou. Ph. D. Sloan School of Management
author2 Jonathan Parker.
author_facet Jonathan Parker.
Lu, Fangzhou. Ph. D. Sloan School of Management
author_sort Lu, Fangzhou. Ph. D. Sloan School of Management
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description Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1156502020-06-15T14:25:19Z Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/ Lu, Fangzhou. Ph. D. Sloan School of Management Jonathan Parker. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management Sloan School of Management. Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-28). This paper evaluate the influence of household heterogeneity on their decisions to take up the vehicle scrappage program (VSP) in China. The presence of debt owed to family and friends (DOFF) on household balance sheet significantly reduces the takeup rate of the cash for clunkers program in China, by approximately 1.57%. Moreover, this effect is stronger among households without a schedule for DOFF repayment, a formal debt contract, or positive interest rate. This suggests that informal finance can have shadow cost due to informal debt's potential recall risk, and non-pecuniary costs in the forms of social sanction. Moreover, I exploit a unique rebate mechanism of the VSP in China to show that the program design and household liquidity together play a big role in determining the take-up rate of the vehicle scrappage program. by Fangzhou Lu. S.M. in Management Research 2018-05-23T16:28:41Z 2018-05-23T16:28:41Z 2018 2018 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115650 1036985305 eng MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 47 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Sloan School of Management.
Lu, Fangzhou. Ph. D. Sloan School of Management
Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/
title Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/
title_full Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/
title_fullStr Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/
title_full_unstemmed Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/
title_short Informal debt contract and consumption : evidence from the vehicle scrappage program/
title_sort informal debt contract and consumption evidence from the vehicle scrappage program
topic Sloan School of Management.
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115650
work_keys_str_mv AT lufangzhouphdsloanschoolofmanagement informaldebtcontractandconsumptionevidencefromthevehiclescrappageprogram