The Design and Price of Information
A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
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American Economic Association
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116348 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9150-2334 |
| _version_ | 1826212571848376320 |
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| author | Bergemann, Dirk Bonatti, Alessandro Smolin, Alex |
| author2 | Sloan School of Management |
| author_facet | Sloan School of Management Bergemann, Dirk Bonatti, Alessandro Smolin, Alex |
| author_sort | Bergemann, Dirk |
| collection | MIT |
| description | A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:25:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/116348 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:25:40Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1163482022-10-02T02:42:05Z The Design and Price of Information Bergemann, Dirk Bonatti, Alessandro Smolin, Alex Sloan School of Management Bonatti, Alessandro A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments. 2018-06-15T18:28:16Z 2018-06-15T18:28:16Z 2018-01 2018-06-13T17:26:51Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116348 Bergemann, Dirk et al. “The Design and Price of Information.” American Economic Review 108, 1 (January 2018): 1–48 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9150-2334 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/AER.20161079 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Bergemann, Dirk Bonatti, Alessandro Smolin, Alex The Design and Price of Information |
| title | The Design and Price of Information |
| title_full | The Design and Price of Information |
| title_fullStr | The Design and Price of Information |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Design and Price of Information |
| title_short | The Design and Price of Information |
| title_sort | design and price of information |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116348 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9150-2334 |
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