Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
As kidney exchange programs are growing, manipulation by hospitals becomes more of an issue. Assuming that hospitals wish to maximize the number of their own patients who receive a kidney, they may have an incentive to withhold some of their incompatible donor-patient pairs and match them internally...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier BV
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116372 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
| _version_ | 1826204666846773248 |
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| author | Ashlagi, Itai Fischer, Felix Kash, Ian A. Procaccia, Ariel D. |
| author2 | Sloan School of Management |
| author_facet | Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai Fischer, Felix Kash, Ian A. Procaccia, Ariel D. |
| author_sort | Ashlagi, Itai |
| collection | MIT |
| description | As kidney exchange programs are growing, manipulation by hospitals becomes more of an issue. Assuming that hospitals wish to maximize the number of their own patients who receive a kidney, they may have an incentive to withhold some of their incompatible donor-patient pairs and match them internally, thus harming social welfare. We study mechanisms for two-way exchanges that are strategyproof, i.e., make it a dominant strategy for hospitals to report all their incompatible pairs. We establish lower bounds on the welfare loss of strategyproof mechanisms, both deterministic and randomized, and propose a randomized mechanism that guarantees at least half of the maximum social welfare in the worst case. Simulations using realistic distributions for blood types and other parameters suggest that in practice our mechanism performs much closer to optimal. Keywords: Approximate mechanisms without money; Kidney exchange |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:59:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/116372 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:59:03Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Elsevier BV |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1163722022-10-01T12:20:29Z Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange Ashlagi, Itai Fischer, Felix Kash, Ian A. Procaccia, Ariel D. Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai As kidney exchange programs are growing, manipulation by hospitals becomes more of an issue. Assuming that hospitals wish to maximize the number of their own patients who receive a kidney, they may have an incentive to withhold some of their incompatible donor-patient pairs and match them internally, thus harming social welfare. We study mechanisms for two-way exchanges that are strategyproof, i.e., make it a dominant strategy for hospitals to report all their incompatible pairs. We establish lower bounds on the welfare loss of strategyproof mechanisms, both deterministic and randomized, and propose a randomized mechanism that guarantees at least half of the maximum social welfare in the worst case. Simulations using realistic distributions for blood types and other parameters suggest that in practice our mechanism performs much closer to optimal. Keywords: Approximate mechanisms without money; Kidney exchange 2018-06-18T18:11:46Z 2018-06-18T18:11:46Z 2013-05 2011-10 2018-06-13T15:25:24Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0899-8256 1090-2473 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116372 Ashlagi, Itai et al. “Mix and Match: A Strategyproof Mechanism for Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange.” Games and Economic Behavior 91 (May 2015): 284–296 © 2013 Elsevier Inc https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2013.05.008 Games and Economic Behavior Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier BV Other univ. web domain |
| spellingShingle | Ashlagi, Itai Fischer, Felix Kash, Ian A. Procaccia, Ariel D. Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title | Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_full | Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_fullStr | Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_short | Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_sort | mix and match a strategyproof mechanism for multi hospital kidney exchange |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116372 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
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