Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018.
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
| Published: |
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2018
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117995 |
| _version_ | 1826209038626455552 |
|---|---|
| author | Martins, Fernando Miguel Pinto |
| author2 | David Thesmar. |
| author_facet | David Thesmar. Martins, Fernando Miguel Pinto |
| author_sort | Martins, Fernando Miguel Pinto |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:16:43Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/117995 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:16:43Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1179952019-04-12T14:39:32Z Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals Martins, Fernando Miguel Pinto David Thesmar. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management. Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 38-40). This paper examines the relationship between classified boards and managerial entrenchment by applying a panel regression discontinuity design to shareholder proposals on board declassification. We focus on shareholder proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in order to provide a causal estimate of the impact of board declassification. We find that shareholder proposal approval leads to a reduction in CEO compensation, an increase in the likelihood of CEO replacement, a positive but insignificant impact on pay-performance elasticity, and an increase in firm value. The reduction in CEO compensation is strongest among firms who possess weaker levels of corporate governance. These findings suggest that classified boards protect top management and lead to higher levels of managerial entrenchment. by Fernando Miguel Pinto Martins. S.M. in Management Research 2018-09-17T15:53:05Z 2018-09-17T15:53:05Z 2018 2018 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117995 1051300054 eng MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 50 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Sloan School of Management. Martins, Fernando Miguel Pinto Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals |
| title | Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals |
| title_full | Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals |
| title_fullStr | Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals |
| title_short | Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals |
| title_sort | do classified boards protect top management evidence from shareholder proposals |
| topic | Sloan School of Management. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117995 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT martinsfernandomiguelpinto doclassifiedboardsprotecttopmanagementevidencefromshareholderproposals |