Can Politicians Police Themselves? Natural Experimental Evidence From Brazil’s Audit Courts
To enhance government accountability, reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of “horizontal accountability,” particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected officials. Yet, these institutions differ in their willingness to punish corrupt politicians, which is ofte...
Main Authors: | Canello, Júlio, Hidalgo, Fernando Daniel, Lima-de-Oliveira, Renato |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
SAGE Publications
2018
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118650 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0237-5060 |
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