Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach
Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence” to a set A if the models both reach A quickly and leave A slowly, where “quickly” and “slowly” refer to whether the expected hitting and exit times remain bounded when N tends to infinity. We provide...
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Imhof, Lorens A., Ellison, Glenn David |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2019
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119847 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-0855 |
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