A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis

We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee ex...

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Main Authors: Parise, Francesca, Ozdagalar, Asuman E.
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier BV 2019
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121465
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author Parise, Francesca
Ozdagalar, Asuman E.
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
Parise, Francesca
Ozdagalar, Asuman E.
author_sort Parise, Francesca
collection MIT
description We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness, convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditions and characterize classes of networks that satisfy each of these conditions. Keywords: network games, variational inequalities, strong monotonicity, uniform P-function, Nash equilibrium, existence and uniqueness, best response dynamics, sensitivity analysis
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spelling mit-1721.1/1214652022-09-27T22:05:17Z A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis Parise, Francesca Ozdagalar, Asuman E. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness, convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditions and characterize classes of networks that satisfy each of these conditions. Keywords: network games, variational inequalities, strong monotonicity, uniform P-function, Nash equilibrium, existence and uniqueness, best response dynamics, sensitivity analysis Swiss National Science Foundation (P2EZP2 168812) Swiss National Science Foundation (P300P2 177805) United States. Army Research Office. Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (W911NF-12-1-0509) 2019-07-01T18:15:12Z 2019-07-01T18:15:12Z 2019-03 2019-06-28T16:52:18Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0899-8256 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121465 Parise, Francesca, and Asuman Ozdaglar. “A Variational Inequality Framework for Network Games: Existence, Uniqueness, Convergence and Sensitivity Analysis.” Games and Economic Behavior 114 (March 2019): 47–82. en 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.012 Games and Economic Behavior Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier BV arXiv
spellingShingle Parise, Francesca
Ozdagalar, Asuman E.
A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
title A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
title_full A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
title_fullStr A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
title_full_unstemmed A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
title_short A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
title_sort variational inequality framework for network games existence uniqueness convergence and sensitivity analysis
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121465
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