Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion
To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of congestion games in which users have differing information sets about the available edges and can only use routes consis...
Main Authors: | Acemoglu, Daron, Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali, Malekian, Azarakhsh, Ozdaglar, Asu |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
2019
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121504 |
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