Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2019
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392 |
| _version_ | 1826202128010444800 |
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| author | Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. |
| author2 | Silvio Micali. |
| author_facet | Silvio Micali. Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. |
| author_sort | Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:02:39Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/122392 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:02:39Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1223922019-11-21T03:03:45Z Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Silvio Micali. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017 Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (page 25). The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann). by Georgios Vlachos. M. Eng. M.Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 2019-10-04T21:31:55Z 2019-10-04T21:31:55Z 2017 2017 Thesis https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392 1120769237 eng MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 25 pages ; application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| title | Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| title_full | Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| title_fullStr | Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| title_short | Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| title_sort | multi unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs |
| topic | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT vlachosgeorgiosmengmassachusettsinstituteoftechnology multiunitauctionrevenuewithpossibilisticbeliefs |