Maintaining Privacy in Cartels
It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels—monitoring of competitors’ prices, sales, and profits—facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead worked to preserve the privacy of their participants’ actions and outcomes. Toward explaining this behavior, we sh...
Main Authors: | Sugaya, Takuo, Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Chicago Press
2019
|
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122787 |
Similar Items
-
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
by: Sugaya, Takuo, et al.
Published: (2022) -
A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
by: Sugaya, Takuo, et al.
Published: (2022) -
Communication and Community Enforcement
by: Sugaya, Takuo, et al.
Published: (2022) -
Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
by: Sugaya, Takuo, et al.
Published: (2018) -
The clumsy cartel
by: Adelman, Morris Albert
Published: (2006)