Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the im...
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier
2019
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086 |
| _version_ | 1811081091484745728 |
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| author | Fudenberg, Drew Kamada, Yuichiro |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Fudenberg, Drew Kamada, Yuichiro |
| author_sort | Fudenberg, Drew |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs, and show how mixed strategies can correspond to heterogeneous play in a large population. We also show that every heterogeneous-belief RPCE can be approximated by a RPCE in a model where every agent in a large pool is a separate player. Keywords: Rationalizability; Extensive-form games; Self-confirming equilibrium; Heterogeneous beliefs; Purification; Random matching |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:41:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/123086 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:41:29Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1230862022-09-27T21:17:11Z Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs Fudenberg, Drew Kamada, Yuichiro Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Fudenberg, Drew Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs, and show how mixed strategies can correspond to heterogeneous play in a large population. We also show that every heterogeneous-belief RPCE can be approximated by a RPCE in a model where every agent in a large pool is a separate player. Keywords: Rationalizability; Extensive-form games; Self-confirming equilibrium; Heterogeneous beliefs; Purification; Random matching National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0646816) National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0951462) National Science Foundation (Grant SES-1258665) 2019-11-25T20:06:28Z 2019-11-25T20:06:28Z 2018-05 2017-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0899-8256 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086 Fudenberg, Drew and Yuichiro Kamada. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs." Games and Economic Behavior 109 (May 2018): 364-381 © 2018 Elsevier Inc http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021 Games and Economic Behavior Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf application/pdf Elsevier Prof. Fudenberg via Nick Albaugh |
| spellingShingle | Fudenberg, Drew Kamada, Yuichiro Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| title | Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| title_full | Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| title_fullStr | Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| title_short | Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| title_sort | rationalizable partition confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fudenbergdrew rationalizablepartitionconfirmedequilibriumwithheterogeneousbeliefs AT kamadayuichiro rationalizablepartitionconfirmedequilibriumwithheterogeneousbeliefs |