Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the im...
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Kamada, Yuichiro |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
Elsevier
2019
|
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086 |
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