Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings
Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequ...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
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American Economic Association
2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124227 |
| _version_ | 1811090545129291776 |
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| author | Khan, Adnan Q. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz Olken, Benjamin |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Khan, Adnan Q. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz Olken, Benjamin |
| author_sort | Khan, Adnan Q. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors that our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:47:53Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/124227 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:47:53Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1242272022-10-01T22:33:31Z Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings Khan, Adnan Q. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz Olken, Benjamin Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors that our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance. 2020-03-24T15:12:35Z 2020-03-24T15:12:35Z 2019-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124227 Khan, Adnan Q. et al. "Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings." American Economic Review 109, 1 (January 2019): 237-270 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180277 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association Nicholas Albaugh |
| spellingShingle | Khan, Adnan Q. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz Olken, Benjamin Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings |
| title | Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings |
| title_full | Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings |
| title_fullStr | Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings |
| title_full_unstemmed | Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings |
| title_short | Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings |
| title_sort | making moves matter experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance based postings |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124227 |
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