Pretrial negotiations under optimism
We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| 其他作者: | |
| 格式: | 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| 出版: |
Wiley
2020
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| 在线阅读: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125000 |
| _version_ | 1826201055849873408 |
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| author | Vasserman, Shoshana Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Vasserman, Shoshana Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author_sort | Vasserman, Shoshana |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:45:58Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/125000 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:45:58Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1250002022-09-27T21:46:17Z Pretrial negotiations under optimism Vasserman, Shoshana Yildiz, Muhamet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts. 2020-05-04T20:07:49Z 2020-05-04T20:07:49Z 2019-04 2019-10-23T16:43:40Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0741-6261 1756-2171 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125000 Vasserman, Shoshana, and Muhamet Yildiz. “Pretrial Negotiations under Optimism.” The RAND Journal of Economics 50, 2 (June 2019): 359–90. en http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12273 RAND Journal of Economics Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Wiley other univ website |
| spellingShingle | Vasserman, Shoshana Yildiz, Muhamet Pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| title | Pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| title_full | Pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| title_fullStr | Pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| title_short | Pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| title_sort | pretrial negotiations under optimism |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125000 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT vassermanshoshana pretrialnegotiationsunderoptimism AT yildizmuhamet pretrialnegotiationsunderoptimism |