Privacy-constrained network formation
We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the indi...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Elsevier BV
2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125736 |
| _version_ | 1826202249884336128 |
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| author | Acemoglu, K. Daron Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh Ozdaglar, Asuman E |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, K. Daron Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh Ozdaglar, Asuman E |
| author_sort | Acemoglu, K. Daron |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the individual suffers as a result of her private information being acquired by others. We specify conditions under which pure-strategy equilibria exist and characterize both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria. The resulting equilibrium networks feature clustered connections and homophily. Clustering emerges because if player a is friend with b and b is friend with c, then a's information is likely to be shared indirectly with c anyway, making it less costly for a to befriend c. Homophily emerges because small additional benefits of friendship within a group make linkages and thus information sharing within that group more likely, further increasing the likelihood within-group links. Keywords: Network formation; Networks; Privacy |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:04:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/125736 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:04:33Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Elsevier BV |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1257362022-09-27T23:58:10Z Privacy-constrained network formation Acemoglu, K. Daron Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh Ozdaglar, Asuman E Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the individual suffers as a result of her private information being acquired by others. We specify conditions under which pure-strategy equilibria exist and characterize both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria. The resulting equilibrium networks feature clustered connections and homophily. Clustering emerges because if player a is friend with b and b is friend with c, then a's information is likely to be shared indirectly with c anyway, making it less costly for a to befriend c. Homophily emerges because small additional benefits of friendship within a group make linkages and thus information sharing within that group more likely, further increasing the likelihood within-group links. Keywords: Network formation; Networks; Privacy Toulouse Network with Information Technology and ArmyResearch Office (Grant ARO MURI W911NF-12-1-0509) 2020-06-09T14:04:51Z 2020-06-09T14:04:51Z 2017-08 2015-08 2019-09-26T12:04:26Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0899-8256 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125736 Acemoglu, Daron et al. "Privacy-constrained network formation." Games and Economic Behavior 105 (September 2017): 255-275 © 2017 Elsevier. en http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.001 Games and Economic Behavior Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier BV SSRN |
| spellingShingle | Acemoglu, K. Daron Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh Ozdaglar, Asuman E Privacy-constrained network formation |
| title | Privacy-constrained network formation |
| title_full | Privacy-constrained network formation |
| title_fullStr | Privacy-constrained network formation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Privacy-constrained network formation |
| title_short | Privacy-constrained network formation |
| title_sort | privacy constrained network formation |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125736 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT acemoglukdaron privacyconstrainednetworkformation AT makhdoumikakhakiali privacyconstrainednetworkformation AT malekianazarakhsh privacyconstrainednetworkformation AT ozdaglarasumane privacyconstrainednetworkformation |