Against preservation
Bradley (2000) offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from t...
| Главные авторы: | , |
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| Другие авторы: | |
| Формат: | Статья |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Oxford University Press (OUP)
2020
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| Online-ссылка: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125751 |
| Итог: | Bradley (2000) offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate. |
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