Against understanding (as a condition on explanation)
The idea that “explanation is that which produces understanding” is commonly accepted and often used to evaluate theories of explanation. But it cannot be used for this purpose. For the claim either means that knowing the answer to the question why X is sufficient for understand why X-in which case...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press
2020
|
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125753 |
| _version_ | 1826198420996489216 |
|---|---|
| author | Skow, Bradford |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Skow, Bradford |
| author_sort | Skow, Bradford |
| collection | MIT |
| description | The idea that “explanation is that which produces understanding” is commonly accepted and often used to evaluate theories of explanation. But it cannot be used for this purpose. For the claim either means that knowing the answer to the question why X is sufficient for understand why X-in which case the claim is false; or it means that answering the question why X by performing the speech act of explaining invariably causes one’s audience to understand why X-in which case the claim is useless, for theories of explanation aim only to say what it takes to be an answer a why-question, not to say what it takes to provide an answer by performing the speech act of explaining. After defending these conclusions, this chapter examines a couple of philosophers’ attempts to use the alleged connection between explanation and understanding to argue against one or another theory of explanation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:04:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/125753 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:04:37Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1257532022-09-27T17:00:08Z Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) Skow, Bradford Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy The idea that “explanation is that which produces understanding” is commonly accepted and often used to evaluate theories of explanation. But it cannot be used for this purpose. For the claim either means that knowing the answer to the question why X is sufficient for understand why X-in which case the claim is false; or it means that answering the question why X by performing the speech act of explaining invariably causes one’s audience to understand why X-in which case the claim is useless, for theories of explanation aim only to say what it takes to be an answer a why-question, not to say what it takes to provide an answer by performing the speech act of explaining. After defending these conclusions, this chapter examines a couple of philosophers’ attempts to use the alleged connection between explanation and understanding to argue against one or another theory of explanation. 2020-06-09T20:38:08Z 2020-06-09T20:38:08Z 2018 2019-11-06T13:13:00Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/BookItem 9780190469863 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125753 Skow, Bradford, "Against understanding (as a condition on explanation)." In Grimm, Stephen R., ed., Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): ch. 11 doi 10.1093/oso/9780190469863.003.0011 ©2018 Author(s) en 10.1093/oso/9780190469863.003.0011 Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Skow, Bradford Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) |
| title | Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) |
| title_full | Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) |
| title_fullStr | Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) |
| title_short | Against understanding (as a condition on explanation) |
| title_sort | against understanding as a condition on explanation |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125753 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT skowbradford againstunderstandingasaconditiononexplanation |