Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, accordi...

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Main Author: Builes, David(David Alan)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Netherlands 2020
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127807
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author Builes, David(David Alan)
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Builes, David(David Alan)
author_sort Builes, David(David Alan)
collection MIT
description The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1278072022-10-02T06:08:00Z Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief Builes, David(David Alan) Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief. 2020-10-05T17:10:58Z 2020-10-05T17:10:58Z 2019-10 2020-09-24T20:38:23Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1573-0883 0031-8116 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127807 Builes, David et al. "Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief." Philosophical Studies 177 (October 2019): 3033–3049 © 2019 Springer Nature en https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01358-1 Philosophical Studies Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. Springer Nature B.V. application/pdf Springer Netherlands Springer Netherlands
spellingShingle Builes, David(David Alan)
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
title Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
title_full Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
title_fullStr Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
title_full_unstemmed Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
title_short Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
title_sort time slice rationality and self locating belief
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127807
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