Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium fo...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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The Econometric Society
2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128136 |
| _version_ | 1811077461718335488 |
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| author | Block, Juan I. Fudenberg, Drew Levine, David K. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Block, Juan I. Fudenberg, Drew Levine, David K. |
| author_sort | Block, Juan I. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than mixed equilibria. When agents observe both the payoff distribution of other agents and the actions that led to those payoffs, and can remember this for some time, the length of their memory plays a key role: With short memories, aggregate play may not come close to Nash equilibrium unless the game satisfies an acyclicity condition. When agents have sufficiently long memory, generically aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium. However, unlike in the model where social information is solely about how well other agents are doing, mixed equilibria can be favored over pure ones. ©2019 The Authors |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:43:24Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/128136 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:43:24Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | The Econometric Society |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1281362022-09-30T22:32:05Z Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory Block, Juan I. Fudenberg, Drew Levine, David K. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than mixed equilibria. When agents observe both the payoff distribution of other agents and the actions that led to those payoffs, and can remember this for some time, the length of their memory plays a key role: With short memories, aggregate play may not come close to Nash equilibrium unless the game satisfies an acyclicity condition. When agents have sufficiently long memory, generically aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium. However, unlike in the model where social information is solely about how well other agents are doing, mixed equilibria can be favored over pure ones. ©2019 The Authors NSF Grant (1643517) 2020-10-20T22:49:27Z 2020-10-20T22:49:27Z 2018-05 2018-04 2019-10-22T18:31:13Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1555-7561 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128136 Block, Juan I. et al., "Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory." Theoretical Economics 14, 1 (January 2019): 135–172 doi. 10.3982/TE2626 ©2018 Authors en https://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE2626 Theoretical Economics Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ application/pdf The Econometric Society Theoretical Economics |
| spellingShingle | Block, Juan I. Fudenberg, Drew Levine, David K. Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| title | Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| title_full | Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| title_fullStr | Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| title_full_unstemmed | Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| title_short | Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| title_sort | learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128136 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT blockjuani learningdynamicswithsocialcomparisonsandlimitedmemory AT fudenbergdrew learningdynamicswithsocialcomparisonsandlimitedmemory AT levinedavidk learningdynamicswithsocialcomparisonsandlimitedmemory |