Getting what you want
It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth Principle’. We argue that this principle is false: an agent may want p without having a desire that is satisfied when p obtains in any...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Science and Business Media LLC
2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128537 |
| _version_ | 1811095279123824640 |
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| author | Grant, Lyndal Phillips-Brown, Milo A |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Grant, Lyndal Phillips-Brown, Milo A |
| author_sort | Grant, Lyndal |
| collection | MIT |
| description | It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth Principle’. We argue that this principle is false: an agent may want p without having a desire that is satisfied when p obtains in any old way. For example, Millie wants to drink milk but does not have a desire that is satisfied when she drinks spoiled milk. Millie has a desire whose satisfaction conditions are what we call ways-specific. Fara (Philos Perspect 17(1):141–163, 2003, Noûs 47(2):250–272, 2013) and Lycan (Philos Perspect 26(1):201–215, 2012, In what sense is desire a propositional attitude?, Unpublished manuscript) have also argued for this conclusion, but their claims about desire satisfaction rest solely on contested intuitions about when agents get what they want. We set these intuitions to one side, instead arguing that desire satisfaction is ways-specific by appealing to the dispositional role of desire. Because agents are disposed to satisfy their desires, dispositions provide important evidence about desire satisfaction. Our argument also provides new insight on the dispositional role of desire satisfaction. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:14:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/128537 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:14:27Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1285372022-09-29T19:04:33Z Getting what you want Grant, Lyndal Phillips-Brown, Milo A Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth Principle’. We argue that this principle is false: an agent may want p without having a desire that is satisfied when p obtains in any old way. For example, Millie wants to drink milk but does not have a desire that is satisfied when she drinks spoiled milk. Millie has a desire whose satisfaction conditions are what we call ways-specific. Fara (Philos Perspect 17(1):141–163, 2003, Noûs 47(2):250–272, 2013) and Lycan (Philos Perspect 26(1):201–215, 2012, In what sense is desire a propositional attitude?, Unpublished manuscript) have also argued for this conclusion, but their claims about desire satisfaction rest solely on contested intuitions about when agents get what they want. We set these intuitions to one side, instead arguing that desire satisfaction is ways-specific by appealing to the dispositional role of desire. Because agents are disposed to satisfy their desires, dispositions provide important evidence about desire satisfaction. Our argument also provides new insight on the dispositional role of desire satisfaction. 2020-11-18T23:31:42Z 2020-11-18T23:31:42Z 2019-04 2020-09-24T20:38:18Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0031-8116 1573-0883 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128537 Grant, Lyndal and Milo Phillips-Brown. "Getting what you want." Philosophical Studies 177, 7 (April 2019): 1791–1810 © 2019 Springer Nature B.V. en https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01285-1 Philosophical Studies Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. Springer Nature B.V. application/pdf Springer Science and Business Media LLC Springer Netherlands |
| spellingShingle | Grant, Lyndal Phillips-Brown, Milo A Getting what you want |
| title | Getting what you want |
| title_full | Getting what you want |
| title_fullStr | Getting what you want |
| title_full_unstemmed | Getting what you want |
| title_short | Getting what you want |
| title_sort | getting what you want |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128537 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grantlyndal gettingwhatyouwant AT phillipsbrownmiloa gettingwhatyouwant |