Coalitional game with opinion exchange
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in which players can exchange opinions about their views of pay...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128882 |
| _version_ | 1826207175329972224 |
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| author | Jiang, Bomin Roozbehani, Mardavij Dahleh, Munther A |
| author2 | MIT Schwarzmann College of Computing |
| author_facet | MIT Schwarzmann College of Computing Jiang, Bomin Roozbehani, Mardavij Dahleh, Munther A |
| author_sort | Jiang, Bomin |
| collection | MIT |
| description | In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in which players can exchange opinions about their views of payoff functions and then decide the distribution of the value of the grand coalition. When all players are truth-telling, the problem of opinion consensus is decoupled from the coalitional game, but interesting dynamics will arise when players are strategic in the consensus phase. Assuming that all players are rational, the model implies that, if influential players are risk-averse, an efficient fusion of the distributed data is achieved at pure strategy Nash equilibrium, meaning that the average opinion will not drift. Also, without the assumption that all players are rational, each player can use an algorithmic R-learning process, which gives the same result as the pure strategy Nash equilibrium with rational players. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:45:14Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/128882 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:45:14Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1288822022-10-01T16:57:02Z Coalitional game with opinion exchange Jiang, Bomin Roozbehani, Mardavij Dahleh, Munther A MIT Schwarzmann College of Computing In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in which players can exchange opinions about their views of payoff functions and then decide the distribution of the value of the grand coalition. When all players are truth-telling, the problem of opinion consensus is decoupled from the coalitional game, but interesting dynamics will arise when players are strategic in the consensus phase. Assuming that all players are rational, the model implies that, if influential players are risk-averse, an efficient fusion of the distributed data is achieved at pure strategy Nash equilibrium, meaning that the average opinion will not drift. Also, without the assumption that all players are rational, each player can use an algorithmic R-learning process, which gives the same result as the pure strategy Nash equilibrium with rational players. 2020-12-21T21:04:26Z 2020-12-21T21:04:26Z 2018-01 2017-12 2019-05-14T14:47:46Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 9781509028733 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128882 Jiang, Bomin et al. "Coalitional game with opinion exchange." IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), December 2017, Melbourne, Australia, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, January 2018. © 2017 IEEE en http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2017.8264400 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) arXiv |
| spellingShingle | Jiang, Bomin Roozbehani, Mardavij Dahleh, Munther A Coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| title | Coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| title_full | Coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| title_fullStr | Coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| title_short | Coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| title_sort | coalitional game with opinion exchange |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128882 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jiangbomin coalitionalgamewithopinionexchange AT roozbehanimardavij coalitionalgamewithopinionexchange AT dahlehmunthera coalitionalgamewithopinionexchange |