Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, September, 2020

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Palida, Ali Fakhruddin.
Other Authors: Robert Gibbons and Glenn Ellison.
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128975
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author Palida, Ali Fakhruddin.
author2 Robert Gibbons and Glenn Ellison.
author_facet Robert Gibbons and Glenn Ellison.
Palida, Ali Fakhruddin.
author_sort Palida, Ali Fakhruddin.
collection MIT
description Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, September, 2020
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spelling mit-1721.1/1289752021-01-06T03:30:02Z Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making Palida, Ali Fakhruddin. Robert Gibbons and Glenn Ellison. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Economics. Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, September, 2020 Cataloged from student-submitted PDF of thesis. Includes bibliographical references. This thesis consists of three separate papers concerning the use of communication channels and intermediaries in organizations. A noisy-signalling model of strategic communication is introduced in the first chapter, and expanded upon in the remainder of the thesis. In the second part of the first chapter, I use the core noisy-signalling model to study organizational design of a single channel of communication. The results of the analysis provide a rational for the variation in communication processes observed across organizations, as well as costly political lobbying and advertising campaigns. In the second chapter, I extend the core model to allow the informed party to choose among multiple communication channels when conversing with the decision maker. The model suggests that polarization across communication channels may be an efficient response to "bandwidth" concerns facing decision-makers of large corporations or unqualified management. Conversely, coexistence of partisan and non-partisan channels within an organization or community (e.g. tabloids and professional news sources in the journalism industry) may also be socially efficient for other environments. In the third chapter, I consider a different extension of the core model by allow- ing the two parties to communicate via a strategic intermediary. I use the model to provide a possible explanation for the variety of roles communication intermediaries play in different organizations, the correlation between control-rights and communication hierarchies in organizations, as well usage of third-party, conflict-resolution arrangements. by Ali Fakhruddin Palida. Ph. D. Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics 2021-01-05T23:10:51Z 2021-01-05T23:10:51Z 2020 2020 Thesis https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128975 1227094325 eng MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 97 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Economics.
Palida, Ali Fakhruddin.
Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making
title Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making
title_full Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making
title_fullStr Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making
title_full_unstemmed Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making
title_short Noisy-signalling models of organizational decision making
title_sort noisy signalling models of organizational decision making
topic Economics.
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128975
work_keys_str_mv AT palidaalifakhruddin noisysignallingmodelsoforganizationaldecisionmaking