The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)
Other Authors: Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi.
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093
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author Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)
author2 Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi.
author_facet Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi.
Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)
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description Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020
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spelling mit-1721.1/1290932021-01-07T03:03:32Z The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander) Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management Sloan School of Management. Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020 Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 52-54). Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, "market transparency") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure. by Georg Rickmann. Ph. D. Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management 2021-01-06T17:39:42Z 2021-01-06T17:39:42Z 2020 2020 Thesis https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093 1227097625 eng MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 75 pages ; application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Sloan School of Management.
Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)
The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
title The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
title_full The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
title_fullStr The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
title_full_unstemmed The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
title_short The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
title_sort effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
topic Sloan School of Management.
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093
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