Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits
We present a method and software for ballot-polling risk-limiting audits (RLAs) based on Bernoulli sampling: ballots are included in the sample with probability p, independently. Bernoulli sampling has several advantages: (1) it does not require a ballot manifest; (2) it can be conducted independent...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer International Publishing
2021
|
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129973 |
| _version_ | 1811082152613249024 |
|---|---|
| author | Ottoboni, Kellie Bernhard, Matthew Halderman, J. Alex Rivest, Ronald L Stark, Philip B. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Ottoboni, Kellie Bernhard, Matthew Halderman, J. Alex Rivest, Ronald L Stark, Philip B. |
| author_sort | Ottoboni, Kellie |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We present a method and software for ballot-polling risk-limiting audits (RLAs) based on Bernoulli sampling: ballots are included in the sample with probability p, independently. Bernoulli sampling has several advantages: (1) it does not require a ballot manifest; (2) it can be conducted independently at different locations, rather than requiring a central authority to select the sample from the whole population of cast ballots or requiring stratified sampling; (3) it can start in polling places on election night, before margins are known. If the reported margins for the 2016 U.S. Presidential election are correct, a Bernoulli ballot-polling audit with a risk limit of 5% and a sampling rate of p0=1% would have had at least a 99% probability of confirming the outcome in 42 states. (The other states were more likely to have needed to examine additional ballots). Logistical and security advantages that auditing in the polling place affords may outweigh the cost of examining more ballots than some other methods might require. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:58:24Z |
| format | Book |
| id | mit-1721.1/129973 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:58:24Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Springer International Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1299732022-09-27T23:10:55Z Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits Ottoboni, Kellie Bernhard, Matthew Halderman, J. Alex Rivest, Ronald L Stark, Philip B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science We present a method and software for ballot-polling risk-limiting audits (RLAs) based on Bernoulli sampling: ballots are included in the sample with probability p, independently. Bernoulli sampling has several advantages: (1) it does not require a ballot manifest; (2) it can be conducted independently at different locations, rather than requiring a central authority to select the sample from the whole population of cast ballots or requiring stratified sampling; (3) it can start in polling places on election night, before margins are known. If the reported margins for the 2016 U.S. Presidential election are correct, a Bernoulli ballot-polling audit with a risk limit of 5% and a sampling rate of p0=1% would have had at least a 99% probability of confirming the outcome in 42 states. (The other states were more likely to have needed to examine additional ballots). Logistical and security advantages that auditing in the polling place affords may outweigh the cost of examining more ballots than some other methods might require. 2021-02-23T16:08:09Z 2021-02-23T16:08:09Z 2020-03 2021-02-04T17:02:05Z Book http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 9783030437244 9783030437251 0302-9743 1611-3349 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129973 Ottoboni, Kellie et al. "Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits." FC: International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 11599, Springer International Publishing, 2020, 226-241. © 2020 International Financial Cryptography Association. en http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43725-1_16 Lecture Notes in Computer Science Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Springer International Publishing arXiv |
| spellingShingle | Ottoboni, Kellie Bernhard, Matthew Halderman, J. Alex Rivest, Ronald L Stark, Philip B. Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits |
| title | Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits |
| title_full | Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits |
| title_fullStr | Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits |
| title_short | Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits |
| title_sort | bernoulli ballot polling a manifest improvement for risk limiting audits |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129973 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ottobonikellie bernoulliballotpollingamanifestimprovementforrisklimitingaudits AT bernhardmatthew bernoulliballotpollingamanifestimprovementforrisklimitingaudits AT haldermanjalex bernoulliballotpollingamanifestimprovementforrisklimitingaudits AT rivestronaldl bernoulliballotpollingamanifestimprovementforrisklimitingaudits AT starkphilipb bernoulliballotpollingamanifestimprovementforrisklimitingaudits |