Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks
Optical networks are vulnerable to a range of attacks targeting service disruption at the physical layer, such as the insertion of harmful signals that can propagate through the network and affect co-propagating channels. Detection of such attacks and localization of their source, a prerequisite for...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer International Publishing
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130059 |
| _version_ | 1826202949795184640 |
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| author | Chan, Vincent W. S. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Chan, Vincent W. S. |
| author_sort | Chan, Vincent W. S. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Optical networks are vulnerable to a range of attacks targeting service disruption at the physical layer, such as the insertion of harmful signals that can propagate through the network and affect co-propagating channels. Detection of such attacks and localization of their source, a prerequisite for secure network operation, is a challenging task due to the limitations in optical performance monitoring, as well as the scalability and cost issues. In this paper, we propose an approach for localizing the source of a jamming attack by modeling the worst-case scope of each connection as a potential carrier of a harmful signal. We define binary words called attack syndromes to model the health of each connection at the receiver which, when unique, unambiguously identify the harmful connection. To ensure attack syndrome uniqueness, we propose an optimization approach to design attack monitoring trails such that their number and length is minimal. This allows us to use the optical network as a sensor for physical-layer attacks. Numerical simulation results indicate that our approach obtains network-wide attack source localization at only 5.8% average resource overhead for the attack monitoring trails. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:28:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/130059 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:28:20Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Springer International Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1300592022-10-05T04:37:15Z Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks Chan, Vincent W. S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Optical networks are vulnerable to a range of attacks targeting service disruption at the physical layer, such as the insertion of harmful signals that can propagate through the network and affect co-propagating channels. Detection of such attacks and localization of their source, a prerequisite for secure network operation, is a challenging task due to the limitations in optical performance monitoring, as well as the scalability and cost issues. In this paper, we propose an approach for localizing the source of a jamming attack by modeling the worst-case scope of each connection as a potential carrier of a harmful signal. We define binary words called attack syndromes to model the health of each connection at the receiver which, when unique, unambiguously identify the harmful connection. To ensure attack syndrome uniqueness, we propose an optimization approach to design attack monitoring trails such that their number and length is minimal. This allows us to use the optical network as a sensor for physical-layer attacks. Numerical simulation results indicate that our approach obtains network-wide attack source localization at only 5.8% average resource overhead for the attack monitoring trails. 2021-03-03T12:44:02Z 2021-03-03T12:44:02Z 2019-05 2020-12-04T16:45:03Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 9783030380854 0302-9743 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130059 Furdek, Marija et al. “Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks.” Paper in the Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 11616 LNCS, ONDM 2019, Athens, Greece, May 13-16, 2019, Springer International Publishing: 310-322 © 2019 The Author(s) en 10.1007/978-3-030-38085-4_27 Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Springer International Publishing Other repository |
| spellingShingle | Chan, Vincent W. S. Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks |
| title | Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks |
| title_full | Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks |
| title_fullStr | Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks |
| title_short | Network-Wide Localization of Optical-Layer Attacks |
| title_sort | network wide localization of optical layer attacks |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130059 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chanvincentws networkwidelocalizationofopticallayerattacks |