Rational monism and rational pluralism
Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occ...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Science and Business Media LLC
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130150 |
| _version_ | 1826204017040031744 |
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| author | Spencer, Jack |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Spencer, Jack |
| author_sort | Spencer, Jack |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:47:30Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/130150 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:47:30Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1301502022-10-01T11:09:29Z Rational monism and rational pluralism Spencer, Jack Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory. 2021-03-17T13:04:44Z 2021-03-17T13:04:44Z 2020-07 2019-10 2021-03-12T18:36:46Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0031-8116 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130150 Spencer, Jack. “Rational monism and rational pluralism.” Philosophical Studies, 106, 3 (July 2020) © 2020 The Author en 10.1007/s11098-020-01509-9 Philosophical Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Springer Science and Business Media LLC Other repository |
| spellingShingle | Spencer, Jack Rational monism and rational pluralism |
| title | Rational monism and rational pluralism |
| title_full | Rational monism and rational pluralism |
| title_fullStr | Rational monism and rational pluralism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rational monism and rational pluralism |
| title_short | Rational monism and rational pluralism |
| title_sort | rational monism and rational pluralism |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130150 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT spencerjack rationalmonismandrationalpluralism |