Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable
This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as w...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press (OUP)
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130152 |
| _version_ | 1811090022760185856 |
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| author | Spencer, Jack |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Spencer, Jack |
| author_sort | Spencer, Jack |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:30:32Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/130152 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:30:32Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1301522022-10-01T21:34:20Z Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable Spencer, Jack Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. 2021-03-17T13:55:01Z 2021-03-17T13:55:01Z 2019-12 2019-10 2021-03-12T18:58:19Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0026-4423 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130152 Ahmed, Arif and Jack Spencer. “Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable.” Mind, 129, 516 ( 2019): 1157-1192 © 2019 The Author(s) en 10.1093/MIND/FZZ070 Mind Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press (OUP) MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Spencer, Jack Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable |
| title | Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable |
| title_full | Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable |
| title_fullStr | Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable |
| title_full_unstemmed | Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable |
| title_short | Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable |
| title_sort | objective value is always newcombizable |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130152 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT spencerjack objectivevalueisalwaysnewcombizable |