The political agenda effect and state centralization
We provide a potential explanation, based on the “political agenda effect”, for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their deman...
Main Author: | Acemoglu, K. Daron |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier BV
2021
|
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130319 |
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