Indirect reciprocity with simple records
Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130345 |
| _version_ | 1826203496138932224 |
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| author | Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg |
| author_sort | Clark, Daniel |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual's record depends on the individual's own past behavior alone, and not on the individual's partners' past behavior or their partners' partners' past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:38:16Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/130345 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:38:16Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1303452022-10-01T10:12:28Z Indirect reciprocity with simple records Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual's record depends on the individual's own past behavior alone, and not on the individual's partners' past behavior or their partners' partners' past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grants SES-1643517 and SES-1555071) Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Grant 2017-9633) 2021-04-02T12:19:36Z 2021-04-02T12:19:36Z 2020-05 2021-04-01T17:34:02Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0027-8424 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130345 Clark, Daniel et al. “Indirect reciprocity with simple records.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 117, 21 (May 2020): 11344-11349 © 2020 The Author(s) en 10.1073/PNAS.1921984117 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences PNAS |
| spellingShingle | Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| title | Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| title_full | Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| title_fullStr | Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| title_full_unstemmed | Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| title_short | Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| title_sort | indirect reciprocity with simple records |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130345 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT clarkdaniel indirectreciprocitywithsimplerecords AT fudenbergdrew indirectreciprocitywithsimplerecords AT wolitzkyalexandergreenberg indirectreciprocitywithsimplerecords |