Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority
We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contracts may achieve relational adaptation that improves on adaptation decisions achieved by formal or rela...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130370 |
| _version_ | 1826194026632577024 |
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| author | Gibbons, Robert S. |
| author2 | Sloan School of Management |
| author_facet | Sloan School of Management Gibbons, Robert S. |
| author_sort | Gibbons, Robert S. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contracts may achieve relational adaptation that improves on adaptation decisions achieved by formal or relational contracts alone. Our empirics consider revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and an exhibitor. The exhibitor has discretion about whether and when to show a movie, and the parties frequently renegotiate formal contracts after a movie has finished its run. We document that such ex post renegotiation is consistent with the distributor rewarding the exhibitor for adaptation decisions that improve their joint payoffs. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:49:22Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/130370 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:49:22Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1303702022-09-26T13:57:36Z Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority Gibbons, Robert S. Sloan School of Management We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contracts may achieve relational adaptation that improves on adaptation decisions achieved by formal or relational contracts alone. Our empirics consider revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and an exhibitor. The exhibitor has discretion about whether and when to show a movie, and the parties frequently renegotiate formal contracts after a movie has finished its run. We document that such ex post renegotiation is consistent with the distributor rewarding the exhibitor for adaptation decisions that improve their joint payoffs. 2021-04-05T18:17:26Z 2021-04-05T18:17:26Z 2020-05 2018-07 2021-04-05T13:50:19Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0025-1909 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130370 Barron, Daniel et al. “Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority.” Management Science, 66, 5 (May 2020): 1868-1889 © 2020 The Author(s) en 10.1287/MNSC.2019.3292 Management Science Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Gibbons, Robert S. Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority |
| title | Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority |
| title_full | Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority |
| title_fullStr | Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority |
| title_full_unstemmed | Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority |
| title_short | Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority |
| title_sort | relational adaptation under reel authority |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130370 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gibbonsroberts relationaladaptationunderreelauthority |